The President is the Chief Executive, But Does Not Control the Mueller Probe by Green, Bruce & Roiphe, Rebecca
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Other Publications
2018
The President is the Chief Executive, But Does Not
Control the Mueller Probe
Bruce Green
Rebecca Roiphe
New York Law School, rebecca.roiphe@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, President/Executive Department Commons, and the
Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Other Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation




The president is the chief exec
but does not control the Muelle
probe
BY BRUCE A. GREEN AND REBECCA ROIPHE, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS — 03/26/18 09:00 AM EDT
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY CONTRIBUTORS ARE THEIR OWN AND NOT THE VIEW OF THE HILL
Just In...
Fortune 500 reveals
what we value: cheap
stuff, tech and health
care




than a year delay: report
ADMINISTRATION — 7M 1S AGO
IRS to issue guidance
on state workarounds to
tax-law provision
FINANCE — 13M 43S AGO
Rubio: Floated ZTE
demands are 'a terrible
deal'
SENATE — 14M 23S AGO
All sides in North Korea
talks have chance to
manipulate the others
OPINION — 18M 41S AGO
Kaine demands answers
on Pentagon missions in
Africa
DEFENSE — 33M 51S AGO
Poisoned daughter of
ex-Russian spy: 'I hope
to return home to my
country'
INTERNATIONAL — 36M 19S AGO
The genius of Prince
Harry and Meghan
Markle
OPINION — 48M 41S AGO
SHARES SHARE TWEET PLU
In an attempt to discredit the investigation into Russian interference in the
2016 presidential election,  has claimed absolute control
over the Department of Justice. His lawyers, no surprise, had echoed his
claim, though they had advised him to be cooperative with the special
counsel. Less obvious allies also have assumed the president’s power over
prosecution. Most recently, two former solicitors general, Neal Katyal and
Ken Starr, used this premise  that
Congress cannot protect ’s investigation from presidential
interference.
A lot rides on this notion, particularly with fresh news reports that the
special counsel has  to turn over
documents related to Russia, bringing the investigation ever closer to the
president.
If the notion is true, then the president can ignore internal DOJ regulations
and  ire Mr. Mueller, and he may be able to avoid a subpoena to testify
before a grand jury. It may follow, as well, that the president could never
be charged with obstruction of justice because he has the power to
interfere with a prosecution for any reason.
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Yes, the president has power to hire and  ire the attorney general. And he
can pardon anyone charged with a federal offense. But he has no power to
control individual prosecutors. He cannot direct or interfere with their
decisions.
The support for the president’s view that he has complete control over all
federal prosecutions is of relatively recent and dubious vintage. It stems
from arguments Richard Nixon made to the Supreme Court when he
sought to avoid handing over the tapes that ultimately toppled his
administration.  but did not address this
question of presidential power directly.
Shortly after, in 1973, the DOJ’s O ice of Legal Counsel 
that relied on Nixon’s own briefs to support his position. In concluding
that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted, the o ice argued that an
indictment is inconsistent with the president’s power as chief law
enforcement administrator.  It reasoned that a president cannot be a
federal defendant because the president oversees federal prosecutions
and cannot be expected to oversee a prosecution of himself.
When similar issues arose during Special Prosecutor Ken Starr’s
investigation of President Clinton, .
The OLC memos and Nixon’s brief are suspect because they were written
with partisan purpose to save a besieged president. Perhaps for that
reason, DOJ regulations and attorney general nominees since Watergate
have emphasized the critical importance of federal prosecutors’
independence from the president. Senators have con irmed these
nominees based on the assurance that they will answer to the law — not
the interests of a president.   
The legal arguments for absolute presidential control over the DOJ, and in
particular prosecutorial decisions, are weak. The Constitution does not
grant the president the power to prosecute; the only explicit role the
Constitution carves out for the president in individual criminal cases is 
. Congress added the right to hire and  ire the
attorney general, but the powers to pardon and to hire and  ire do not
necessarily imply the power to control decisions in individual criminal
cases.
The Constitution does vest executive authority in the president and
directs the president to “take care” that the laws are faithfully executed.
But the Constitution does not vest all executive authority in the president
and the president can ful ill his obligation by  iring incompetent
prosecutors. The Supreme Court agreed with these limits on presidential
power in  when it stated that prosecution is an
executive function but insisted that Congress nonetheless had the power
to create a special prosecutor, independent of the president.
Congress subsequently has let that law — which created Mr. Starr’s post —
sunset. As a result, there is no law on the books establishing an
independent prosecutor or otherwise protecting federal prosecutors’
independence. In cases such as these, when Congress has been silent,
courts often look to tradition and practice.
Prosecutorial independence has been a reality of American prosecution
and an animating theme since the founding. Although presidents
occasionally, and unsurprisingly, try to use their attorneys general to
enforce a political agenda, they usually are limited to dictating policy
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priorities. Congress created the DOJ in 1870 to ensure that professional
values would protect the law department from partisan in luence.
Insulating prosecutors from presidential control allows them to pursue
criminal justice without partisan pressure. It allows them to use their
professional experience and judgment to be fair and even-handed, a value
that is critically important when individual liberty is at stake.
Partisan concerns should play no role in the decision to charge or to
dismiss a case, or in any other of the myriad choices that prosecutors
make in criminal investigations. Many from both political parties were
reassured when Mueller was appointed special counsel, not because he
was a Republican but because 
, able to transcend partisan interests for the sake of  inding
facts and doing justice.
Of course, it is important to ensure that prosecutors who wield so much
power are accountable to the public. But this need for accountability must
be balanced by independence. The president himself cannot be held
accountable if facts are sacri iced to a partisan agenda or self-interest. If
President Trump prevents Mr. Mueller from uncovering the truth about
Russia and the Trump campaign, the public would be voting without
necessary information.
As the Supreme Court recognized in upholding the subpoena for Nixon’s
tapes, no one is above the law. This would be an empty platitude without
maintaining the prosecutorial independence that has become a
cornerstone of American democracy.
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